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Unilateral Promises: Scots Law Compared with the PECL and
the DCFR*
Hector L. MACQUEEN**
Abstract: This contribution compares the recognition of a general concept of
unilateral promises, binding without acceptance by the promisee, in Article 2:107 of
the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) and Article II.-1:103 of the Draft
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) with the equivalent Scottish rule. The
significance of this comparison is that the rule in question is significantly wider than
that found in most other European legal systems, which tend to recognize only limited
categories of unilateral promises or to impose a requirement of acceptance. Despite an
authoritative restatement of the law by Lord President Gill in Regus (Maxim) Ltd v.
Bank of Scotland plc [2013] CSIH 12, the Scottish courts have generally approached
the concept in a restricted and restrictive way, although at least occasionally allowing
it a role even in commercial cases. The decision of the UK Supreme Court in the
Scottish appeal Royal Bank of Scotland v. Carlyle [2015] UKSC 13 poses a significant
challenge to such caution, and the judges’ self-imposed restrictions are also
inconsistent with the DCFR’s approach. On the other hand, the Scottish experience
suggests that the DCFR’s requirement that notice of the promissory statement must
reach the promisee to make it effective except when the statement is a public
declaration may, in turn, be too demanding. It is also suggested, in opposition to a
suggestion by Professor Martin Hogg, that from both the DCFR and the Scottish
experience the conduct of the recipient after the statement is made may be relevant to
the question of whether the statement can be treated as a binding promise.
Résumé: Cette contribution compare la reconnaissance d’un concept général de
promesse unilatérale juridiquement contraignante indépendamment de l’acceptation
du bénéficiaire, aux Articles 2: 107 PDEC et II.-1: 103 PCCR, avec la récente
expérience écossaise d’une règle équivalente. L’intérêt de cette comparaison provient
de ce que la règle en question a un domaine sensiblement plus étendu que celles
connues de la plupart des autres systèmes juridiques européens, qui ont tendance à ne
reconnaître que des catégories limitées de promesses unilatérales ou à exiger une
acceptation du bénéficiaire. En dépit de la récente réaffirmation de la règle par le Lord
President Gill dans l’arrêt Regus (Maxim) Ltd v. Bank of Scotland plc [2013] CSIH
12, les tribunaux écossais ont généralement interprété le concept d’une manière
limitée et restrictive, même s’il a pu occasionnellement jouer un rôle en matière
commerciale. La décision de la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni dans l’affaire écossaise
* All URLs were last checked on 31 Jul. 2015. For ease of reference, citations of Scottish
institutional writers are to the page numbers of the most recent editions or reprints rather than
by the conventional book, title, and section. Scottish court decisions since 1998 may be accessed
at http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/ or at http://www.bailii.org/.
** Hector L. MacQueen is Scottish Law Commissioner and Professor of Private Law at the
University of Edinburgh.
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Royal Bank of Scotland v. Carlyle [2015] UKSC 13 incite à remettre en cause cette
circonspection, d’autant que les restrictions que s’imposent les juges sont également
incompatibles avec l’approche retenue dans le PCCR. Néanmoins, l’expérience
écossaise donne à penser que la règle posée dans le PCCR subordonnant l’efficacité de
la promesse au fait qu’elle ait été portée à la connaissance du bénéficiaire, hors
l’hypothèse d’une déclaration publique, pourrait être trop exigeante. En s’appuyant à
la fois sur le PCCR et sur l’expérience écossaise, il est également suggéré, à l’encontre
de la proposition du professeur Martin Hogg, que le comportement du bénéficiaire
une fois qu’il a eu connaissance de la promesse peut être pertinent pour décider si
celle-ci peut être considérée comme juridiquement contraignante.
Zusammenfassung: Dieser Beitrag vergleicht das in Article 2:107 PECL und Article
II.-1:103 DCFR niedergelegte allgemeine Konzept von Versprechen, die ohne
Annahme verbindlich sind, mit den jüngsten Erfahrungen mit einer entsprechenden
Regel im schottischen Recht. Die Bedeutung des Vergleichs liegt darin, dass letztere
Regel deutlich weiter geht als ihr Äquivalent in den meisten anderen europäischen
Rechtssystemen, die nur begrenzte Kategorien einseitiger Zusagen anerkennen oder
eine Annahme verlangen. Trotz einer autoritativen Neuformulierung des Rechts durch
Lord President Gill in Regus (Maxim) Ltd v. Bank of Scotland plc [2013] CSIH 12
sind die schottischen Gerichte dem Konzept generell zurückhaltend
gegenübergetreten, auch wenn sie es gelegentlich sogar in Handelssachen
herangezogen haben. Die Entscheidung des UK Supreme Court in der schottischen
Berufungssache Royal Bank of Scotland v. Carlyle [2015] UKSC 13 stellt diese
Zurückhaltung in Frage, obwohl die von den Richtern selbst auferlegte Zurückhaltung
auch mit dem Ansatz des DCFR nicht übereinstimmt. Andererseits legt die schottische
Erfahrung nahe, dass die Anforderung des DCFR, wonach zur Wirksamkeit des
Versprechens eine Mitteilung darüber dem Versprechensempfänger zugehen muss,
sofern es nicht selbst in öffentlicher Mitteilung erfolgt ist, zu weitgehend sein könnte.
Darüber hinaus schlägt der Beitrag unter Berücksichtigung des DCFR und der
Erfahrung mit der schottischen Regel entgegen dem Vorschlag von Professor Martin
Hogg vor, dass in der Beurteilung, ob das Versprechend als bindend anzusehen ist, das
nachträgliche Verhalten des Versprechensempfängers zu berücksichtigen sein könnte.
Introduction
One of the happiest teaching experiences of my academic career was to stand in
Arthur Hartkamp’s shoes in the ancient university of Utrecht in the autumn of
1997 to deliver a Masters course on European Contract Law. I refer to Arthur’s
footwear only metaphorically, of course, and in any event, I was quite unworthy
even to tie his laces when it came to the subject matter of the course. He was an
impressive colleague on the Lando Commission for a European Contract Law
(which I joined in 1995). Full of knowledge and erudition that was by no means
limited to law, his experience included work on the new Dutch Civil Code (1992)
and the then even newer Unidroit Principles of International Commercial
Contracts (1994). As a tyro in such projects, I stood in awe of him and the many
other similarly veteran proponents of codes, restatements, and conventions on the
Lando Commission. However, the kindly welcome and encouragement that I
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received has stayed with me as an example of how senior scholars should treat
their juniors.
The subject of this tribute in Arthur’s honour is not one on which I recall
dwelling with my sixty or so Utrecht students in 1997. Although the Principles of
European Contract Law (PECL), produced by the Lando Commission, already
included a draft Article 2:107 that provided that ‘a promise which is intended to
be legally binding without acceptance is binding’,1 the handout for my seminar on
the formation of contracts focused instead on the doctrine of offer and acceptance
and the problem of the ‘battle of the forms’. In that area, of course, the PECL
provided that there might be a contract even if the offer and acceptance referred
to conflicting general conditions of contract.2 However, I do not think this
departure from the standard doctrines of formation even took me to the further
rule that the PECL rules on offer and acceptance applied, with appropriate
modifications, even though the process of contract formation could not be
analysed into offer and acceptance.3 What I can now see, however, is that this
meant that the PECL distinguished its promissory obligation from other
contractual ones in a significant way, even if the Article on promise went on to
say in its second sentence that the rules on contract applied to the former ‘with
appropriate adaptations’.
Comparative examination of Article 2:107 PECL would also have shown
me that its rule was a quite striking innovation upon the position in most
European jurisdictions. In the Netherlands, for example, there is recognition of
unilateral promises as a type of offer, the acceptance of which by the offeree can
be presumed unless the latter rejects it without delay.4 The Italian Civil Code
provides that a unilateral promise of performance is not binding, save in cases
specifically provided for in the law, such as a promise to pay and acknowledge a
debt, and promises to the public.5 Reinhard Zimmermann has shown that German
law ‘does not recognize any general principle to the effect that unilateral promises
are legally binding or can be’. Instead, it provides only for specific cases such as
public promises of reward (Auslobung).6 In French law, the promesse unilatérale
1 This became Art. 2:107 PECL.
2 Article 2:209 PECL.
3 Article 2:211 PECL.
4 D. BUSCH, E. HONDIUS, H. VAN KOOTEN, H. SCHELHAUS & W. SCHRAMA (eds), The Principles of
European Contract Law and Dutch Law: A Commentary (The Hague/London/New York: Ars
Aequi Libri, Nijmegen & Kluwer Law International 2002), pp 102–103.
5 Codice Civile, Arts 1987–1989.
6 R. ZIMMERMANN, ‘Vertrag und Verspechen: Deutsches Recht und Principles of European Contract
im Vergleich’, in S. Lorenz, A. Trunk, H. Eidenmüller, C. Wendehorst & J. Adolff (eds),
Festschrift für Andreas Heldrich zum 70. Geburtstag (München: C H Beck 2005), pp 467–483
(quotation translated here at p 482).
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de vente, i.e., the granting of an option to buy where acceptance by the
beneficiary is not required, must be either notarially executed or registered on
pain of nullity.7 Article 1124 of the new French law on obligations declares that a
unilateral promise is a contract by which the promisor agrees to provide a
beneficiary with a right for a certain period of time to opt to conclude a contract
of which the essential elements are already determined. The promisor cannot
revoke the promise during the stipulated period, and any contract formed with a
third party in violation of the promise is null if the third party knew of the
promise’s existence. It is clear that this Article provides an exception to an
otherwise general rule that unilateral promises are not enforceable as such.8
Finally, in English law, a unilateral promise is enforceable only if it is made in a
written deed, or if the promisee has provided consideration in return for the
benefit, whereby it becomes a contract the formation of which is analysed in terms
of offer and acceptance, or if the circumstances are such as to give rise to
promissory estoppel.9
It is therefore significant that the Draft Common Frame of Reference
(DCFR), published in 2009, not only reaffirms the basic rule of Article 2:107
PECL but also elaborates further upon it. Article II.-1:103 DCFR (Binding effect)
replaces the word ‘promise’ with the formula ‘valid unilateral undertaking’ but
otherwise restates Article 2:107 PECL, emphasizing the lack of any need for
acceptance to make the undertaking binding. Article II.-4:301 DCFR reinforces
the earlier Article by spelling out the requirements for a unilateral juridical act,
i.e., acts by a person having specific effects in law. These are that the actor
intends to be legally bound or achieve the relevant legal effect, that the act is
sufficiently certain, and that notice of the act reaches the person to whom it is
addressed. Finally, if the act is addressed to the public, it must be made public ‘by
advertisement, public notice or otherwise’. Article II.-4:302 DCFR provides that
the party’s intention is to be determined from its statements or conduct as these
7 B. NICHOLAS, The French Law of Contract (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn 1992),
pp 65–66; J. GORDLEY (ed.), The Enforceability of Promises in European Contract Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002), p 280.
8 Ordonnance n° 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant réforme du droit des contrats, du régime
général et de la preuve des obligations, accessible at http://www.justice.gouv.fr/. Note also
B. FAUVARQUE-COSSON, ‘Negotiation and Renegotiation: A French Perspective’, in J. Cartwright,
S. Vogenauer & S. Whittaker (eds), Reforming the French Law of Obligations: Comparative Re-
flections on the Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations et de la prescription (‘the
Avant-projet Catala’) (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing 2009), p (33) at 34 and 39.
9 E. PEEL (ed.), Treitel The Law of Contract (London: Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters, 13th
edn 2011), paras 3-012, 3-076-3-99, and 3-170–3-173.
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were reasonably understood by the person to whom the act is addressed,10 while,
under Article II.-4:303 DCFR, that person may also reject its right or benefit from
the act by notice to the other party, provided that this is done without undue
delay. The Article slightly undermines the general non-requirement of acceptance
by also saying that the right to reject may be lost if the person expressly or
impliedly accepts the right or benefit. However, the effect of a successful rejection
is that the right or benefit is treated as never having accrued.
The national notes to the DCFR Articles show further that, by and large,
the new Civil Codes of the countries that joined the European Union in 2004
(Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic)
have not followed the model of the general enforceability of unilateral promises or
undertakings but instead recognize this only in cases specifically set out in the law
(public promises, for example), or where the promise is an offer and the
promisee’s active acceptance is necessary to create a binding contract.11 However,
this does not mean that the PECL and the DCFR provisions on unilateral
promises, binding without any acceptance by the promisee, are without parallel in
European legal systems. The national notes to both texts state that Belgium,
Scandinavian jurisdictions, and Scotland all recognize the general possibility that
an obligation may be created unilaterally by a party making a promise or giving an
undertaking, with no need for any act of acceptance by the beneficiary or
promisee.
In assessing the value of these provisions, accordingly, it seems worthwhile
to consider the experience of these jurisdictions that have such similar rules
already in place. I must leave for another occasion or to another person better
equipped to undertake the task the analysis of Belgium and the Scandinavian
countries.12 In Scotland, however, there has been a considerable amount of recent
case law on unilateral promises, especially in commercial settings. While the
courts have been reluctant to deploy the concept in that context in particular,
there has been some confusion in their approach to the subject, which may be
clarified by comparison with the DCFR. I will suggest that the most recent
judicial decision, a 2015 case of the United Kingdom Supreme Court on an appeal
from Scotland, points in the right direction, albeit that some procedural
peculiarities of the case may serve initially to conceal its true significance.
10 See also Art. II.-8:201 DCFR on the interpretation of unilateral juridical acts.
11 C. VON BAR & E. CLIVE (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law:
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) Full Edition [DCFR] (Munich: Sellier, 6 vols 2009),
vol. 1, pp 136–138.
12 There is nothing from Scandinavia in Enforceability of Promises, supra n. 7; but from the Belgian
contribution by I. Corbisier, the law seems rather similar to French law (see index entry
‘Belgium’).
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Unilateral Promises Binding Without Acceptance in Scots
Law
The first Scottish jurist to distinguish between contract and unilateral promise as
distinct categories (within the heading of what he called ‘conventional
obligations’) was James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair (1619–1695). James Gordley
has rightly grouped Stair among the ‘northern natural lawyers’ who also included
Grotius and Pufendorf and who followed the late scholastics in seeing promises in
general as binding in nature on the persons who made them, with the question
then being how far positive law might square with that position.13 In his
Institutions of the Law of Scotland, first published in 1681, Stair began his
account with the proposition that individual liberty – ‘a natural faculty to do that
which every man pleaseth, unless he be hindered by law or force’ – was also ‘the
most native and delightful right of man, without which he is capable of no other
right’.14 Liberty was, however, not absolute; it was limited by, among other
things, a person’s ‘own delinquence [in other words, wrongdoing] or consent’,
both of which could subject the person to obligations to others.15 For Stair,
‘conventional obligations do arise from our will and consent’.16 By engaging with
another in the appropriate fashion, a person could give up liberty and become
subject to that other’s power of exaction, ‘whereby he may restrain, or constrain
us to the doing or performing of that whereof we have given him power of
exaction; as in the debtor, it is the debtor’s duty or necessity to perform’.17
However, Stair continued, ‘it is not every act of the will that raiseth an obligation,
or power of exaction . . . We must distinguish between three acts in the will,
desire, resolution and engagement’.18 Neither desire (a tendency or an inclination
of the will towards its object) nor resolution (a determinate purpose to do that
which is desired) was enough to create a right in another. To achieve a right,
there had to be engagement (the conferral or statement of a power of exaction in
another). Such engagement was possible by one person alone by way of a promise,
with no requirement for any action by the promisee: ‘the obligatory act of the will
13 See the following writings by J. GORDLEY, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1991), pp 71–77; ‘Some Perennial Problems’, in Enforceability of
Promises, supra n. 7, pp 2–10; Foundations of Private Law: Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust
Enrichment (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006), Ch. 13; The Jurists: A Critical History
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013), Ch. V. See also W. DECOCK, Theologians and Contract
Law: The Moral Transformation of the Ius Commune (ca. 1500–1650) (Leiden and Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff 2013), Ch. 3.3–5.
14 J. DALRYMPLE VISCOUNT STAIR, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland (2nd edn 1691; reprinted
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1981), p 96.
15 Ibid., pp 96–99 (quotation at p 96).
16 Ibid., p 195.
17 Ibid., p 196.
18 Ibid., p 196.
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is sometimes absolute and pure’.19 A contract (or paction), on the other hand, is
‘the consent of two or more parties to some things to be performed by either of
them’; ‘not a consent in their opinions, but a consent in their wills, to oblige any
of them’.20 Engagement could be expressed conditionally, such that either the
obligation did not come into existence at all until the condition was fulfilled or
that fulfilment of the condition made performance of an already existent
obligation enforceable.21 An example of the first situation was the offer, in which
‘there is implied a condition, that before it become obligatory, the party to whom
it is offered must accept’.22 ‘But’, Stair went on, ‘a promise is that which is simple
and pure, and hath not implied as a condition, the acceptance of another’.23 It is
not thought that by this he meant to exclude the possibility of a conditional
promise where the conditionality went to the enforceability (as distinct from the
very existence) of an obligation; a point to which we will return.24 Stair’s final
observation was that the promisee’s renunciation of the promise was an act of that
party’s will, which was effective to void the right created by the promisor’s action:
‘not’, he said, ‘by the negative non-acceptance, but by the contrary rejection’.25
In his recognition of the promise binding without acceptance by the
promisee, Stair noted that ‘[i]n this Grotius differeth’.26 So did many other of the
northern natural lawyers, before and after Stair’s time. His position on the point
was, however, followed by Scottish writers up to the middle of the eighteenth
century.27 John Erskine, Professor of Scots Law at Edinburgh University
(1738–1765), was the first to introduce the idea of ‘presumed acceptance’, which
19 Ibid., p 197.
20 Ibid., p 198.
21 Ibid., p 196.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p 197.
24 See R. ZIMMERMANN & P. HELLWEGE, ‘Belohnungsversprechen: “pollicitatio”, “promise” oder
“offer”’, in Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung 1998, p (133) at 138–139, for the suggestion that
when Stair referred to pollicitatio he meant promise sub conditione.
25 STAIR, supra n. 14, p 197.
26 Ibid.
27 See W. FORBES, The Institutes of the Law of Scotland 1722 and 1730 (reprinted and edited with
an introduction by H. L. MacQueen, Edinburgh: Avizandum for Edinburgh Legal Education
Trust, Old Studies in Scots Law 2012), vol. 3, p 192; W. FORBES, A Great Body of the Law of
Scotland (unpublished MS of c.1720 in Glasgow University Library, accessible at http://forbes.
gla.ac.uk/contents/), p 818; A. MCDOUALL LORD BANKTON, Institute of the Laws of Scotland in
Civil Rights with Observations upon the Agreement or Diversity between Them and the Laws of
England in Four Books, after the General Method of the Viscount Stair’s Institutions (1751; re-
printed Edinburgh: Stair Society 1993), vol. 41, pp (228–229) at 324; H. HOME, LORD KAMES,
Principles of Equity (Edinburgh: 1760; Edinburgh: 3rd edn 1778, reprinted and edited with an
introduction by M. Lobban; Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Natural Law and Enlightenment Classics
2014), p 118 (also reprinted and edited with an introduction by D.J. Carr, Edinburgh: Avizandum
for Edinburgh Legal Education Trust, Old Studies in Scots Law 2013), p 195.
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thereafter held sway among Scottish jurists down to the middle of the twentieth
century.28 However, there was also powerful judicial support for Stair’s approach
as early as the mid-nineteenth century. His view of the law was expressly approved
in 1864 by Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis (later Lord President of the Court of Session
and probably the most influential Scottish judge of the period):
A promise is a pure and simple expression of the will of the party undertaking
the obligation, requiring no acceptance, and still less requiring mutual consent
... It appears to me that when a party, in terms of this letter, agrees to pay £100
he is making a promise, and that by the bare act of his will thus expressed he
undertakes an obligation to pay, which requires no acceptance.29
It was, however, well into the second half of the twentieth century before
the efforts of T. B. Smith (successively Professor of Scots Law at Aberdeen
(1949–1958) and Professor of Civil, then Scots Law, at Edinburgh (1958–1972),
and a Scottish Law Commissioner (1965–1980)) persuaded both other writers and
the courts that a doctrine of presumed acceptance was of little utility in the
analysis of unilateral promises.30 So long as the promisee had the power to
renounce the benefit of the promise, there was no need to manufacture an act of
acceptance.31 What seems likely to be the definitive judicial statement came from
Lord President Gill in Regus (Maxim) Ltd v. Bank of Scotland plc in 2013:
28 J. ERSKINE, An Institute of the Law of Scotland 1st edition 1773 (reprinted and edited with an
introduction by K. G.C. Reid, Edinburgh: Avizandum for Edinburgh Legal Education Trust, Old
Studies in Scots Law 2014), p 483, and see further W.D.H. SELLAR, ‘Promise’, in K. Reid &
R. Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (Oxford: Oxford University Press
2000), vol. 2, p (252) at 271–272.
29 Macfarlane v. Johnston (1864) 2 M. 1210 (CSIH), p 1213, per Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis. See also
the same judge in Vallance v. Forbes (1879) 6 R. 1099 (CSIH), p 1101.
30 See the following works of T.B. SMITH: A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland (Edinburgh:
W Green & Son Ltd 1962), Ch. 32; Studies Critical and Comparative (Edinburgh: W Green &
Son Ltd 1962), pp 168–182. Cf. The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia
(henceforth SME), vol. 15 (Edinburgh: Butterworths for The Law Society of Scotland 1996),
paras 611–618; W.W. MCBRYDE, The Law of Contract in Scotland (Edinburgh: W Green & Son
Ltd for the Scottish Universities Law Institute Ltd, 3rd edn 2007), Ch. 2; H.L. MACQUEEN & J.
THOMSON, Contract Law in Scotland (Haywards Heath: Bloomsbury Professional, 3rd edn 2012),
paras 2.54–2.63. Differences of opinion between Smith and the English Law Commissioner
L.C.B. Gower on whether a concept of unilateral promise needed legal recognition are among the
reasons why the joint project of the English and Scottish Law Commissions to produce a contract
code for the United Kingdom failed in 1973: see H.L. MACQUEEN, ‘Glory with Gloag or the Stake
with Stair? T B Smith and the Scots Law of Contract’, in E. Reid & D.L. Carey Miller (eds), A
Mixed Legal System in Transition: T B Smith and the Progress of Scots Law (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press 2005), p (138) at 159–160.
31 See however the discussion in MCBRYDE, supra n. 30, paras 2.28–2.34.
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In my opinion, a promise in the law of Scotland is a unilateral juristic act. It
acquires its binding force by reason of the declarant’s expression of his will to
be bound. . . . [B]ecause in Scots law a promise acquires its obligatory nature
at the moment at which it is made, questions of acceptance and of actings in
reliance on it are irrelevant.32
There are numerous instances, in Scots law, of obligations being held to
come into existence without any acceptance by the offeree. Firm offers, under
which an offeror promises not to exercise its power to revoke for a certain period
of time, and third-party rights in contracts are long-established instances,33 and
one might add commitments made in invitations to treat or tender, such as that
the highest bid will be accepted or that all tenders submitted on time will be
considered under a particular process.34 Many further examples are found in legal
practice35 and case law.36 Options to purchase heritage (immovable property)
contained in mutual writings embodying contracts between the parties, such as,
for example, a lease of land under which the tenant is also granted an option to
buy the land, have generally been held to confer a right upon the beneficiary
without any need for acceptance.37 In Carmarthen Developments Ltd v.
Pennington, Lord Hodge said:
32 Regus (Maxim) Ltd v. Bank of Scotland plc [2013] CSIH 12, 2013 SC 331 (hereafter Regus
(Maxim)), paras 33–34.
33 MCBRYDE, supra n. 30, paras 6.42, 10.07; J. A.K. HUNTLEY & A.K. DEDOULI, ‘Third Party Rights,
Promises and the Classification of Obligations’, Juridical Review 2004, p (303) at pp 332–336.
34 Examples from non-Scottish cases include Harvela Investments v. Royal Trust Company of
Canada [1986] AC 207; Blackpool & Fylde Aero Club v. Blackpool Borough Council [1990] 1
WLR 1995. On the latter situation, see also Sidey Ltd v. Clackmannanshire Council [2011]
CSOH 194, 2012 SLT 334, as discussed in M. HOGG, ‘Liability for Improperly Rejected Contract
Tenders: Legitimate Expectations, Contract, Promise and Delict’, Edinburgh Law Review 2012,
p 246.
35 For example, solicitors’ ‘letters of obligation’: see generally G.L. GRETTON & K. G.C. REID,
Conveyancing (Edinburgh: W Green, 4th edn 2011), paras 2.10–2.11 and 9.25–9.28; A. STEWART,
‘A New Era in Conveyancing: Advance Notices and the Land Registration etc (Scotland) Act
2012’, in F. McCarthy, J. Chalmers & S. Bogle (eds), Essays in Conveyancing and Property Law
in Honour of Professor Robert Rennie (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers 2015), Ch. 8.
36 See, for example, Muirhead v. Gribben 1983 SLT (Sh. Ct.) 102; Lord Advocate v. Glasgow
District Council 1990 SLT 721 (CSIH); Sim v. Howat [2011] CSOH 115, para. 33 (liability of
reconstituted partnership for old partnership’s debts promissory, per Lord Hodge). Cf. Smith v.
Stuart [2010] CSIH 29, 2010 SC 490.
37 Sichi v. Biagi 1946 SLT (Notes) 1; Scott v. Morrison 1979 SLT (Notes) 65; Stone v. Macdonald
1979 SC 363; Miller v. Frame 2002 SLT 459. All CSOH. Cf. McDougall v. Heritage Hotels Ltd
[2008] CSOH 54, 2008 SLT 494.
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[M]ost arrangements which are described as options have certain effects. First,
until the party to whom the option has been granted intimates his intention to
exercise the option, he is under no obligation to purchase the option subjects.
Secondly, once a contract or unilateral promise has created the option, the
exercise of that option is the exercise of the right conferred by that contract or
promise and not the acceptance of an offer. Thirdly, when the party in whose
favour the option has been given intimates the exercise of that right he
becomes bound to complete the contract by purchasing the subjects. Thus
while the exercise of the option by the grantee brings into being bilateral
obligations, that effect does not make the exercise of the option the acceptance
of an offer.38
The option itself thus seems normally to be a unilateral promise to enter a
contract of sale should the condition of the prospective purchaser’s intimation of
an intention to exercise the option be fulfilled. The formation of the actual
contract of sale will be a separate juridical act of the contracting parties.
Defining Unilateral Promises
However, what exactly distinguishes a promise from an offer apart from the need
for acceptance? Erskine explored the issue in terms of indicative language: ‘words
proper to express a present act of the will, such as, I promise, or I oblige myself,
to give, or make over in a present’.39 However, words by themselves cannot be
enough. As Stair had earlier pointed out, in determining whether or not any
voluntary obligation exists, ‘it is much to be considered, whether the consent be
given animo obligandi, to oblige or not’.40 The same words may or may not be
interpreted as obligatory, depending on the circumstances in which they are
uttered and the speaker’s intent, derived mostly (but not entirely) from an
external perspective:
[I]f it be jestingly or merrily expressed, whatsoever the words be, there is no
obligation; because thereby it appears there is no mind to oblige; [but] if the
words be in affairs or negotiations, they are interpreted obligatory, though they
express no obligation but a futurition, which otherwise would import no more
than a resolution; as Titius is to give Mevius an hundred crowns, in any matter
of negotiation, this would be obligatory, but otherwise it would be no more but
an expression of Titius’ purpose so to do; yet because it is inward and
unknown, it must be taken by the words or other signs, so if the words be
38 Carmarthen Developments Ltd v. Pennington [2008] CSOH 139, para. 15 (citations omitted).
39 ERSKINE, supra n. 28, p 482.
40 STAIR, supra n. 14, p 198.
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clearly obligatory and serious, no pretence that there was no purpose to oblige
will take place.41
Stair’s emphasis on ‘affairs or negotiations’, i.e., business dealings, as a
context in which the necessary obligatory intention can be taken as a given is
worth noting in the light of the apparently different approach in modern courts,
to be discussed further below.42
Professor Martin Hogg of Edinburgh has recently defined a promise as a
human institution (i.e., as opposed to one divinely pre-ordained): ‘a statement by
which one person commits to some future beneficial performance, or the
beneficial withholding of a performance, in favour of another person’.43 In Hogg’s
impressive and generally persuasive analysis, which draws on linguistic and
philosophical as well as legal discussions, a promise is more than merely an
internal process for the promisor.44 The necessary external act or statement of the
promisor may in general, however, be by way of ‘spoken words, writing or
behaviour (for instance, a nod of the head in response to a question asking
whether a promise is intended)’.45 It is thus possible to bring into account oral
and other behavioural modes of promising (an important point for Scots law,
which recognizes the possibility of an unwritten promise being effective).46 A
promise is, for Hogg, a commitment to performance by the promisor; not, for
example, to the truth or otherwise of some statement about a natural
phenomenon or the performance of some other person. The commitment must be
more than illusory and not of something the promisor cannot fulfil or is very
unlikely to be able to fulfil. It must relate to the future rather than some past
event, although statements deploying the future tense (‘I will’, or ‘I intend’) are
not by that fact alone to be regarded as promissory. The promisor’s commitment
must be in favour of another person. Promises fall to be distinguished from vows
to a god or gods, and oaths by which a person reinforces a commitment by
reference to a god or gods; neither of these necessarily involves a commitment to
another person as recognized by law. Promises are also to be distinguished from
threats, where the threatener’s commitment is to harm rather than benefit
another person. Hogg concludes that a statement is not to be characterized as
promissory as a result of the effects it produces on other parties, such as
detrimental reliance or trust. I will return to this point at the end of my paper.
41 Ibid.
42 See text accompanying n.56.
43 M. HOGG, Promises and Contract Law; Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 2011), p 6.
44 Ibid., pp 4–57.
45 Ibid., p 10.
46 See further text accompanying n.58 and n.59 below.
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Testing the Definition in Court
The modern Scottish case law does not, on the whole, yield up many positive
examples with which to test such attempts at definition. Most judicial decisions
are against findings that a promise has been made, especially in a commercial
context. In Krupp Uhde GmbH v. Weir Westgarth Ltd,47 for example, the parties
were members of a consortium construction project. W issued a letter to K,
undertaking to transfer sums due as retention monies to a third party in the
consortium. The sums were to be transferred to K in consideration of a loan made
by K to the third party’s parent company. W’s letter was in the following terms:
We confirm receipt of a letter . . . from [the third party] a copy of which is
attached, requesting us to amend remittance instructions in respect of the two
retention payments specified therein. We undertake that we shall comply with
[the third party’s] irrevocable instructions therein and on the terms and
conditions specified in the said letter.
The question was whether this undertaking by W amounted to a unilateral
promise to K to pay the sums mentioned in the earlier letter, or whether, along
with that earlier letter, it amounted to no more than an assignation (assignment)
by the third party of its claims to the retention monies coupled with a non-binding
confirmation of W’s intention to make payment of these monies. The court
preferred the latter approach. The parties had not had any commercial contact
before W’s letter was issued to K, and adoption of the promise analysis would, in
effect, be to make W guarantors of the third party’s debt to K. Such an unusual
obligation had to be spelled out with clarity, given the lack of prior dealings
between the parties, and the language of W’s letter was at best ambiguous.
In Ballast plc v. Laurieston Properties Ltd, a statement by a party (A) in a
complex building project that payment of an outstanding sum ‘will’ be made
directly into the account of another party (B) on a particular date and that all
future payments thereafter will be paid directly from A’s account, when previously
payments had been made from the account of yet another party (C), was held to
be merely one advising of a change in payment mechanism and not a binding
undertaking to make all the payments falling due to B in the project.48 Referring
to Erskine’s passage about obligatory words, Lady Paton observed:
I am unable to accept the proposition that the word ‘will’ necessarily connotes
the undertaking of a legally enforceable obligation. It may do, depending on
47 Summarized at 2002 GWD 19-620, accessible in full online at http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/
search-judgments/judgment?id=df3287a6-8980-69d2-b500-ff0000d74aa7.
48 Ballast plc v. Laurieston Properties Ltd [2005] CSOH 16.
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the context and the circumstances: . . . But having heard all the evidence in the
present case I am not persuaded that the use of the future tense in relation to a
description of the source of future payments has a legally binding effect.49
The question in Countess of Cawdor v. Earl of Cawdor50 was whether or
not the defenders (the Earl and others, acting as trustees of the ‘Number 1’ trust
scheme) had intended to make a unilateral promise to transfer certain pension
fund assets to the pursuers (the Dowager Lady Cawdor and others, acting as
trustees of the ‘Number 2’ trust scheme). The pursuers alleged that such a
promise had been made by the Number 1 trustees at a meeting of its board, after
which some assets were transferred to the Number 2 trustees but not the
complete amount expected. The First Division of the Court of Session had to
consider whether a minute of the meeting, not delivered to any other party,
setting out that the trustees had ‘after due consideration decided that they would
comply with Lord and Lady Cawdor’s requests for transfer payments’, amounted
to a unilateral promise in favour of the Number 2 trustees. Giving the leading
opinion, Lord President Hamilton thought not. Citing Stair’s analysis of desire,
resolution, and engagement, he commented:
In my view, although this was a formal meeting at which the trustees proceeded
on the basis of professional advice, they went no further than the stage of
‘resolution’ referred to by Stair. They ‘decided’ that they ‘would comply’ with
Lord and Lady Cawdor’s requests for a transfer payment . . . The circumstance
that the meeting was not followed by a communication with the No. 2 Scheme
trustees tends also to support the proposition that it was not intended that the
decision taken at the meeting should of itself give rise to an obligation to
them.51
What seems to have been crucial in the Cawdor case, therefore, was the
absence of communication of the alleged promise to the promisee, which
negatived the presence of the necessary intention of the promisor to be bound.
Lord Hamilton also remarked that ‘the presence or absence of communication to
the other party may be an adminicle of evidence in the question whether the
statement amounts to a promise in law’.52
49 Ibid., para. 147.
50 [2007] CSIH 3, 2007 SC 285.
51 Ibid., para. 15.
52 Ibid., para. 15. See also MacDonald v. Moir’s Executrix [2015] CSOH 101, para. 31 (per Lord
Tyre).
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In Van Klaveren v. Servisair UK Ltd,53 statements accepting liability to the
party to whom they were addressed were held not to amount to a binding
undertaking to pay damages in satisfaction of that liability, because extrajudicial
admissions of liability are generally revocable and thus distinct from binding
unilateral undertakings. The court did state, however, that it is possible in Scots
law to undertake a unilateral obligation not to contest liability.
Lord Gill in his Regus (Maxim) opinion cited Stair and the Cawdor case as
authority on how to determine whether a statement was a promise:
Since any promissory obligation is intention-based, the court’s task is to
consider whether the evidence, objectively assessed, discloses an intention on
the part of the alleged promisor to incur a legally binding
engagement . . . [citations omitted]. That question, in my view, is to be
decided on a consideration of the alleged promisor’s own words. Bearing in
mind the stringent consequences of a valid promise that I have described, I
consider that a promise is binding only if the promisor’s own words are clear
and unambiguous.54
Under that approach, there was held to be no promise in a bank’s written
‘confirmation’ to the tenant of a commercial development that ‘we hold [a] sum
of £913,172 to meet the landlord’s commitment to fit-out costs’, which ‘funds will
be released in accordance with the drawdown procedures agreed between the
parties’.
Some Comments on the Court’s Approach
While it goes too far to suggest that there is a presumption against a unilateral
statement being taken as a promise, akin to the presumption against donation
already recognized in Scots law,55 judicial reluctance to accept that there may be
unilateral obligations in a commercial setting is very apparent. The reasons for
this have to be inferred but at least one strong possibility is doubt as to whether it
is at all likely that one business party would undertake to do something for
nothing for another. In Regus (Maxim), for example, Lord Gill spoke of ‘an initial
improbability that a bank, whose normal obligations are owed to its customer,
53 Van Klaveren v. Servisair UK Ltd [2009] CSIH 37, 2009 SLT 576.
54 [2013] CSIH 12, 2013 SC 331, para. 36.
55 Cf. G. BLACK (ed.), Woolman on Contract (Edinburgh: W Green & Son Ltd, 5th edn 2014), para.
4.04 (presumption in favour of contract rather than promise). For a possible example, see Wylie
v. Grosset [2011] CSOH 89, 2011 SLT 609. For the presumption against donation in Scots law,
see LORD EASSIE & H. L. MACQUEEN (eds), Gloag & Henderson: The Law of Scotland (Edinburgh:
W Green, 13th edn 2012), para. 13.28.
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should choose to make a binding promise in favour of a third party’.56 Yet that
doubt (which, as already noted, would not have been shared by Stair)57 is
inconsistent with the policy to be seen in the 1995 legislation setting out a
general requirement that promises must be in formal writing to be effective but
making an exception for promises made in the course of business.58 Such
promises may therefore be made in informal writing(in other words, writing not
subscribed by the promisor), orally, or indeed by appropriate conduct. The
legislative aim was to meet concerns that a number of unilateral undertakings
commonly in use by businesses of various kinds would otherwise be invalidated.59
In other contexts, Scottish courts have often referred to the need to avoid putting
artificial hurdles in the way of perfectly intelligible commercial activity,60 and to
be suspicious of the possibility of a business making a unilateral promise may be
to do just the opposite.
Further, it is not obvious why an alleged unilateral promise must be in
clear and unambiguous words to receive any effect. If lack of clarity or ambiguity
in wording in a bilateral or multilateral commercial transaction were to mean no
contract, there might be quite serious damage to the economy. Lord Gill’s more
considered approach in Regus (Maxim) seems preferable:
It may be that the meaning of the promisor’s words will be clear if they derive
their meaning from the relevant factual background known to both
parties. . . . [I]n a commercial context, the words of an alleged promise should
be interpreted in the same way as any other alleged commercial obligation
would be. . . . [That is], objectively on the basis of what a reasonable recipient
with knowledge of the background would have understood by the documents in
question.61
In essence, clarity should not have to leap from the page or the exact words
of the promise; it may instead emerge through the process of interpretation.62 It
is also significant that Lord Gill, like the DCFR, recognizes that the interpretive
process should consider what the reasonable addressee would have understood the
56 Regus (Maxim), supra n. 32, para. 42.
57 See text accompanying n.41 and n.42.
58 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 1(2)(a)(ii).
59 Report on Requirements of Writing (Edinburgh: HMSO, Scot Law Com No. 112, 1988), paras
2.23–2.24.
60 See, e.g., R & J Dempster Ltd v. Motherwell Bridge and Engineering Co. Ltd 1964 SC 308, p 332
per Lord Guthrie (CSIH).
61 Regus (Maxim), supra n. 32, para. 38.
62 The Scottish approach to interpretation is, however, narrower than that in Arts II.-8:101–8:202
DCFR: see Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No. 147 on Interpretation of Contract
(Edinburgh: HMSO 2011).
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statement to mean.63 A relevant difference between promise and contract is that
with the latter the court is necessarily seeking a common (and therefore artificial)
intention of the parties in the wording used, while with the former the goal is
determining the intention of the promisor. That cannot be judged subjectively on
either side of the undertaking, but an objective standard can come from the
perspective of the reasonable promisee.64
Promises Subject to Suspensive or Resolutive Conditions
At first blush, the finding in Van Klaveren v. Servisair UK Ltd that the revocable
character of a statement necessarily meant no promise seems obvious. Professor
Hogg also gives the example of a promise to pay next Monday if the promisor has
not changed her mind by then, where the highly subjective nature of the
condition effectively undermines the notion of any promissory commitment.65
However, he goes on to suggest that a promise to pay by a certain date in the
more distant future subject to the promisor retaining a power to revoke should
the changing nature of its relationship with the promisee so warrant ‘is not so
sweeping as to be suggestive of a lack of an original intention to be bound at all’;
the example ‘might be argued to be a permissible condition’ rather than a
negation of any promise.66 Further, the idea that if a promisee fulfils the
suspensive conditions necessary to enforce its right before any resolutive
condition occurs is familiar in the Scots law of third-party rights in contract, and
there seems no reason why it should not apply also to simple unilateral
promises.67
The common example of the promise subject to a suspensive condition is
the public promise of a reward on the occurrence of an uncertain future event: for
example, finding and returning the promisor’s lost dog or cat. Another crucial
point in such cases is highlighted by Lord Gill in the Regus (Maxim) case: ‘[The
promise] is binding even though it is not known to the promisee. If it is
conditional, it will become binding if the condition is fulfilled, even though the
promisee did not know of the original promise’.68
63 See text accompanying n.10.
64 DCFR, vol. 1, p 572.
65 HOGG, supra n. 43, pp 30–35.
66 Ibid., pp 33–34. See Kinch Ltd v. Adams [2015] SCGLA 8, 2015 GWD 5-105, for a possible
example.
67 See Love v. Amalgamated Society of Lithographic Printers of Great Britain and Ireland 1912 SC
1078; Kelly v. Cornhill Insurance Co. Ltd 1964 SC (HL) 46. The cases are discussed in Scottish
Law Commission Discussion Paper No. 157 on Third Party Rights in Contract (Edinburgh:
HMSO 2014), paras 2.70–2.78. For conditions in the DCFR, see its Art. III.-1:106.
68 Regus (Maxim), supra n. 32, para. 34. A possible example is Petrie v. Earl of Airlie (1834) 13
S. 38.
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A promisee must, of course, be in existence and aware of the promise at
the time when enforcement of the obligation is sought, but that does not preclude
the promisor being bound at an earlier stage.69 Thus, a binding promise can be
made in favour of a person who is unaware of it (as in the example above of the
finder of the lost cat, who hands it in at the police station, unaware that its owner
has promised a reward to the finder), or who is unable to understand or
appreciate its significance (a baby or an incapable adult), or who is not yet in
existence when the promise is made (e.g., an unborn child or a company not yet
incorporated). It is thought, however, that in the case of the promisee not in
existence at the time the promise is made there is no obligation at all until the
suspensive condition of existence is fulfilled; before then, the promisor has the
power to withdraw.70
A further implication of the conditional promise’s binding quality is that,
as Lord Gill remarked, communication of it to the promisee is not always
required, nor delivery of the relevant document to the creditor where the promise
is in writing, which is otherwise a general requirement of Scots law with regard to
the effectiveness of written obligations.71 As remarked in the Cawdor case,
however, communication or delivery (where it occurs) can be important evidence
of the promisor’s concluded intention to be bound. However, it is not clear that
Scots law in this area is exactly the same as the DCFR, where notice to the
addressee is required for an effective unilateral juridical act unless it is addressed
to the public, in which case it must be made public in appropriate fashion.72 It
would also seem to follow that the promise need not be directly addressed to the
promisee. A significant element in the Regus (Maxim) decision that no promise
had been made by the bank was that the relevant letter was addressed to the
landlord’s solicitors, not the tenant, and was in fact a copy of a letter that had
been used a year earlier in relation to another lease in the same development.
However, the letter’s addressee may not have been quite as decisive a fact as the
69 Note too in this context Lord Gill’s comment that ‘[W]here the promise is made subject to a
condition requiring action by the promisee, the fulfilment of the condition does not convert the
promise into a contract ex post facto. The late Sir Thomas Smith pointed out that the distinction
between a conditional promise and a conditional offer may be narrow . . . but in my view it is a
material and significant distinction nonetheless’ (Regus (Maxim), supra n. 32, para. 35 (citing
T.B. SMITH, ‘Pollicitatio – Promise and Offer’, Acta Juridica 1958, p (141) at 148–150).
70 See ERSKINE, An Institute, supra n. 28, p 413. Note also W.M. GLOAG, The Law of Contract
(Edinburgh: W Green & Son Ltd, 2nd edn 1929), p 4 (‘Obligations in Favour of Non-existing
Party’); D.N. MACCORMICK, ‘General Legal Concepts Reissue’, in SME, supra n. 30, para. 73.
71 See generally MCBRYDE, supra n. 30, Ch. 4. See further Act 1995, supra n. 58, s. 9F, and Legal
Writings (Counterparts and Delivery) (Scotland) Act 2015, s. 4.
72 Article II.-4:301(c) DCFR.
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court seems to have thought against the possibility that a promise was being made
in this indirect fashion.73
Royal Bank of Scotland v. Carlyle
None of the foregoing comments is meant to suggest that any of the cases was
wrongly decided. The judges involved were in a much better position than any
commentator to take a conclusive view of the whole of the material before them.
They contrast significantly, however, with the final case for discussion: the March
2015 decision of the UK Supreme Court in Royal Bank of Scotland v. Carlyle.74 It
is yet another case about the financing of commercial activity, but this time the
argument that the bank’s commitment to a business person was obligatory was
successful. The case arose from a transaction between the bank (henceforth RBS)
and a property developer (Mr Carlyle, henceforth C) that began to be negotiated
early in 2007. The facts were largely undisputed. C’s business model as a property
developer was to buy a plot of land, build house(s) there in which he then lived
briefly, before selling at a profit and moving on to his next project. In the vibrant
property market prevailing in Scotland before the credit crunch began in July
2007, leading on to the financial crash in 2008, C’s business was a very successful
one. He had regular dealings with RBS under which the bank made loans to him,
secured on the properties they were used to acquire. The bank would also make
separate finance available to cover C’s development costs on the property.
At the beginning of 2007, C became aware of an opportunity to buy a plot
of land being offered for sale in Gleneagles (an estate in the very attractive
Perthshire countryside, also famous for its five-star hotel and three championship
golf courses, one of which was to host the Ryder Cup competition in the autumn
of 2011). Under the prospective deal, C would build two houses on the plot.
These had to be completed by 31 March 2011 or the vendor would be entitled to
buy back the land at the original sale price (there was concern that the sight of
uncompleted houses around the golf course would be bad for TV coverage of the
Ryder Cup). C deferred completion of the purchase while he also negotiated with
RBS over the finance he would need. RBS was willing to make the loan funding,
but it remained unclear for a long time whether it was also willing to provide the
development costs funding. Throughout these discussions, C made it clear that he
would not take the loan funding without development funding of up to GBP
700,000 also being in place. On 14 June 2007, the RBS representative placed a
73 Regus (Maxim), supra n. 32, para. 43.
74 Royal Bank of Scotland v. Carlyle [2015] UKSC 13, 2015 SC (UKSC) 93 (hereafter Carlyle
(Supreme Court)).
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phone call to C and, with reference to the development funding application, said
to him: ‘You’ll be pleased to know it’s all approved, Edinburgh are going for it for
both houses’. This was the key statement for consideration in the later litigation
between RBS and C, although there was also evidence from RBS managers that C
was told on several other occasions that development costs funding would be
advanced. In August 2007, RBS lent C GBP 1.4 million to buy the land, repayable
twelve months later. The contracts were put in writing, but no written
confirmation was ever made with regard to the development funding of up to GBP
700,000. C was unworried by this as, previously, completion of
development-funding formalities had generally followed some time after the loan
agreements had been executed. He went ahead with his purchase of the land and
began the development. A year later, with the loan funding due for repayment,
the financial crisis had engulfed RBS (which was effectively nationalized, or
‘bailed out’ by the UK Government in October 2008). C failed to pay on time,
arguing that he was entitled to withhold his payment because RBS was in breach
of its obligation to provide development costs funding. The bank raised an action
of payment against C and also succeeded in having him declared bankrupt.
The case thus turned on the significance in law of the telephonic statement
made by RBS in June 2007. At first instance, it was argued for C that the
statement was a ‘collateral warranty’.75 It may be that his lawyers avoided
reference to unilateral promise because arguments based on that concept had had
so little traction with the court in the recent past. The key words – ‘You’ll be
pleased to know it’s all approved, Edinburgh are going for it for both houses’ –
could hardly be said to be clearly promissory in nature. In any event, only English
cases were cited to the court on collateral warranties.76 From these, it might be
inferred that the basic idea is one of oral representations made by one party to
another, both of whom are also parties to a separate written contract, with the
representor being liable in damages for the untruth of its representation if that
induced the representee to enter the written contract. The approach was therefore
one of characterizing the telephone statement as an untrue statement by RBS
about its intentions regarding the development costs funding that had induced C
to enter the written loan agreements and, indeed, the contract to buy the land at
Gleneagles.
Lord Glennie at first instance emphasized that ‘there is no magic in a
collateral warranty . . . It is simply a contract, usually oral, which is collateral or
75 Royal Bank of Scotland v. Carlyle [2010] CSOH 3 (hereafter Carlyle (Outer House)).
76 These were Heilbut Symons & Co. v. Buckleton [1913] AC 30 (HL); Dick Bentley Productions Ltd
v. Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd [1965] 1 WLR 623 (CA); J Evans & Son (Portsmouth) Ltd v.
Andrea Merzario Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 1078; Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Mardon [1976] 1 QB 801
(CA); and Inntrepreneur Pub Co. (GL) v. East Crown Ltd [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611.
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ancillary to another contract (the principal contract) between the same parties’.77
However, he also talked about a ‘representation or promise made by one party to
the other, which . . . is intended to have binding effect (notwithstanding that it is
not included in the terms of the principal contract’.78 He held that the telephonic
statement, ‘viewed objectively in the context of what had gone on before’,
committed RBS to providing the development costs funding.79 C’s reliance upon
the statement in entering the loan contracts was clear from the respective timings.
The promise, as Lord Glennie was calling the statement by this point in his
opinion, was sufficiently certain to be enforced: ‘The amount of the advance
sought was set out in the initial proposals submitted to the Bank. It was GBP
700,000 then, and it never changed. Whether it would all be taken up would
depend on progress in the sale of other properties, but that does not affect the
principle’.80
On appeal, the Second Division of the Court of Session reversed Lord
Glennie’s decision and held in favour of RBS.81 In reaching this conclusion, the
court made much more extensive use than Lord Glennie of Scottish authority and
concepts, clearly including that of unilateral promise. However, the fundamental
reason for the decision is a perception that the meaning C sought to give the
telephone statement was ‘somewhat improbable . . . major banks do not normally
lend private individuals (or companies) millions of pounds . . . without setting out
the terms and conditions of such a facility in writing’.82 C knew from the previous
course of dealing with RBS that the development costs funding would be the
subject of a written agreement. All that had taken place on the telephone,
therefore, was a statement of future intention, with the creation of obligations to
come later when a formal agreement was executed. The statement may well have
been truthful as to the bank’s intention when made, with a change of mind
coming only later: ‘[t]hat’, said the court, ‘may have been contrary to the spirit of
the negotiations prior to the signing of the written agreements [of loan], but that
spirit, or its moral content, cannot be taken as creating a legally binding voluntary
obligation’.83
In the Supreme Court, however, Lord Glennie’s decision was reinstated.84
This was primarily because the Court thought that the Second Division had
77 Carlyle (Outer House), supra n. 75, para. 37. Written undertakings generally known as ‘collateral
warranties’ are familiar in Scottish as in English construction law practice: see Scottish Law
Commission Discussion Paper No. 157, supra n. 67, paras 3.20–3.28.
78 Carlyle (Outer House), supra n. 75, para. 37.
79 Ibid., para. 40.
80 Ibid., para. 42.
81 Royal Bank of Scotland v. Carlyle [2013] CSIH 75, 2014 SC 188.
82 Ibid., para. 60.
83 Ibid., para. 63.
84 Carlyle (Supreme Court), supra n. 74.
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overstepped its appellate function in reviewing Lord Glennie’s findings of fact and
drawing different conclusions on them. There is, accordingly, relatively little in
the single judgment delivered by Lord Hodge on the proper legal characterization
of the telephonic statement, but what is there is telling. He rightly said that the
use of the term ‘collateral warranty’ in the lower courts had been a ‘distraction …
[e]ither “promise” or “unilateral undertaking” would have been a suitable choice
of words for the independent legal obligation which Mr Carlyle was asserting’.85
He might also have noted that, the bank having given the undertaking in the
course of business, the requirement of formal writing did not apply – but he did
not do so.86 Although Lord Hodge thought that, had he been deciding the case at
first instance, he might have shared the Second Division’s view that the statement
was the communication of a ‘decision in principle’ so that further steps were
required to create an obligation on RBS with regard to development costs
funding,87 he did also note Scottish authority to the effect that parties’ informal
arrangements may bind them even if they also intend to put those arrangements
on a formal written footing later.88 On the Division’s suggestion that such a way
of proceeding on the part of a bank was improbable, Lord Hodge drily noted that
‘it is notorious that the prudence which historically has been attributed to Scottish
bankers was not always in evidence in commercial and mortgage lending in the
years leading up to the financial crisis in 2008’.89 His quotation from the New
Zealand Court of Appeal’s judgment in Fletcher Challenge Energy Ltd v.
Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd was also significant as an implicit
rejection of the Scottish courts’ previous narrow approach requiring ‘clear words’
for a unilateral promise:
The court has an entirely neutral approach when determining whether the
parties intended to enter into a contract. Having decided that they had that
intention, however, the Court’s attitude will change. It will then do its best to
give effect to their intention and, if at all possible, to uphold the contract
despite any omissions or ambiguities.90
85 Ibid., para. 33. Note here Lord Hodge’s earlier use of the concept of promise when still in the
Court of Session in Sim v. Howat, supra n. 36.
86 See above text accompanying n.58.
87 Carlyle (Supreme Court), supra n. 74, para. 20.
88 Ibid., para. 25 (citing Stobo Ltd v. Morrisons (Gowns) Ltd 1949 SC 184 [CSIH]).
89 Carlyle (Supreme Court), supra n. 74, para. 26. For a highly critical account of RBS’s small
business lending practices before the financial crisis, see IAN FRASER, Shredded: Inside RBS: The
Bank that Broke Britain (Edinburgh: Birlinn 2014), pp 376–383.
90 Fletcher Challenge Energy Ltd v. Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd [2002] 2 NZLR 433,
para. 58, quoted Carlyle (Supreme Court), supra n. 74, para. 29.
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This is reinforced as such by Lord Hodge’s own further observation: ‘As in
the formation of other contracts the court applies an objective test, asking what a
reasonable outside observer would infer from all the circumstances’.91 However,
this does differ from the perspective of the ‘reasonable recipient’ favoured by
Lord Gill in Regus (Maxim) and the DCFR. For reasons already indicated, the
latter approach may be preferable for unilateral promises,92 but in practice, there
may be little difference in result. In any event, the Carlyle case well illustrates
how words may take on a promissory character when understood in the context in
which they came to be uttered. A final, related point arises from Martin Hogg’s
previously noted comment that the detrimental reliance, or trust, of the addressee
does not of itself convert a statement into a promise.93 While this is in general
true, the addressee’s reaction to a statement must be part of the material falling
to be considered in determining how the reasonable recipient would have
understood it. C’s understanding of and trust in what was said to him on the
telephone sprang primarily from the undisputed evidence of what took place
between him and the bank before the call, but his actions afterwards were an
important confirmation of that understanding and his faith in what the bank
would do thereafter. Further, had the promise been one that required formal
writing under the 1995 Act, C would still have been permitted to prove it and to
refer to his subsequent detrimental actions, known to and permitted by the
promisor, to have it held enforceable against the latter.94 It would seem odd to
preclude such reference when the alleged promise did not have to be formally
written.
Conclusion
While, in the main, recent Scottish experience with a general concept of
unilateral promises binding without acceptance by the promisee does not suggest,
as a consequence, a tsunami of unpredictable liabilities, it does seem that, at least
sometimes, it could play a role even in commercial cases. However, there may not
be enough here to persuade other systems, recognizing only a limited number of
special cases of unilateral promises or having some requirement of acceptance
over and above the promise, to change their position to something more akin to
that found in the DCFR. Scots law itself is unlikely to abandon its requirement of
formal writing in relation to unilateral promises, which has no equivalent in the
DCFR. It may also raise a question about the DCFR’s requirement that notice of
the promise must reach the addressee to be effective except when it is a public
declaration. However, the Carlyle case, properly understood, should make the
91 Ibid., para. 35.
92 See text accompanying n.63 and n.64.
93 See specifically HOGG, Promises, supra n. 43, p 25.
94 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 1(3), (4).
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Scottish courts rethink their ‘clear and unambiguous words’ test in favour of
something like the DCFR’s more open but still objective and demanding test of
what the reasonable recipient of the statement would have understood by it. The
DCFR, at least, is clear that the subsequent conduct of the parties is a relevant
consideration in the interpretation of the statement. This may go further than
present Scots law in general,95 but it is worthy of note that the promisee’s
subsequent conduct can be used to uphold the promisor’s obligation when it
should have been but was not, in formal writing.
95 See Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No. 147, supra n. 62, paras 5.21–5.22.
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